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ABSTRACT
Robust speaker recognition, including in the presence of malicious attacks, is becoming increasingly
important and essential, especially due to the proliferation of several smart speakers and personal
agents that interact with an individual’s voice commands to perform diverse, and even sensitive tasks.
Adversarial attack is a recently revived domain which is shown to be effective in breaking deep neural
network-based classifiers, specifically, by forcing them to change their posterior distribution by only
perturbing the input samples by a very small amount. Although, significant progress in this realm
has been made in the computer vision domain, advances within speaker recognition is still limited.
The present expository paper considers several state-of-the-art adversarial attacks to a deep speaker
recognition system, employing strong defense methods as countermeasures, and reporting on several
ablation studies to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the problem. The experiments show that
the speaker recognition systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, and the strongest attacks can
reduce the accuracy of the system from 94% to even 0%. The study also compares the performances
of the employed defense methods in detail, and finds adversarial training based on Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) to be the best defense method in our setting. We hope that the experiments presented
in this paper provide baselines that can be useful for the research community interested in further
studying adversarial robustness of speaker recognition systems.
Keywords Adversarial attack · Deep neural network · Speaker recognition
1 Introduction
Deep learning models are recently found to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [1, 2] where the attacker potentially
discovers blind spots in the model, and crafts adversarial samples that are only slightly different from the original
samples, rendering the trained model fail to correctly classify them or even to perform any other inference task on
them. Over the last few years, several researchers have devoted significant effort in devising novel adversarial attack
algorithms [3, 4, 5, 6], proposing defensive countermeasures to gain robustness [3, 4], and demonstrating exploratory
analyses [6, 7, 8].
∗Authors contributed equally.
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Adversarial attack on speech processing systems. With the rapid increase in the incorporation of Deep Neural
Networks (DNN) within speech processing applications like Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) [9, 10], speaker
recognition [11, 12, 13, 14], and speech emotion and behavior studies [15, 16], it is becoming essential to study the
probable weaknesses of the employed models in the presence of adversarial attacks. In [17], the authors have shown that
it is possible to achieve even 100% success rate in attacking deep ASR systems. In [18] the authors have successfully
generated imperceptible (to humans) adversarial audio samples while retaining high attack success rate. These studies
highlight the vulnerability of deep ASR models against adversarial attacks.
Adversarial attack on speaker recognition systems. Speaker recognition models are being widely employed in
several applications including smart speakers and personal digital assistants [19, 11], bio-metric systems [20], and
forensics [21]. Therefore, having robust speaker recognition models that are not susceptible to adversarial perturbation
is an important requirement. However, speaker recognition models have not been investigated extensively in the
presence of adversarial attacks. Some initial work can be found in the literature (please refer to Section 3), but a detailed
analysis of white box attacks (will be discussed in Section 2.2) with state-of-the art attack algorithms is difficult to find.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, effective defensive countermeasures for those attacks have not been proposed.
The present work aims to address these issues in particular.
Contributions. This paper focuses on adversarial attacks and possible countermeasures for deep speaker recognition
systems, with the following contributions.
• In contrast to previous works in this field (discussed in Section 3), we perform adversarial attack directly on
the time domain speech signal (and not on the spectrogram), which is more realistic in real-life scenarios.
• We provide an extensive analysis of the effect of multiple state-of-the-art white box adversarial attacks on a
DNN-based speaker recognition model.
• We propose multiple defensive countermeasures for the deep speaker recognition system, and analyze their
performance.
• We perform transferability analysis [8] to investigate how adversarial speech crafted with a particular model
can also be harmful to a different model.
• We present various ablation studies (e.g., varying the strength of the attack, measuring signal-to-noise ra-
tio (SNR) and perceptibility of the adversarial speech samples etc.) that might be helpful to gain a comprehen-
sive understanding of the problem.
• We share ready-to-run software implementation2 of the present work toward supporting reproducibility and
further research.
We aim to set baselines in the present exposition study, and hope it can help the community interested to continue
further research in this domain.
Paper outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide preliminaries about speaker
recognition and adversarial attack. In Section 3, we highlight the related work. The adversarial attack algorithms and
defense strategies are introduced in Section 4. Experimental setting and results are described in Section 5 and Section 6,
respectively. Finally, conclusions and future directions are provided in Section 7.
2 Preliminary
2.1 Speaker recognition systems
Speaker recognition systems can be developed either for identification or verification [11] of individuals from their
speech. In a closed set speaker identification scenario [11, 14], we are provided with train and test utterances from a set
of unique speakers. The task is to train a model that, given a test utterance, can classify it to one of the training speakers.
Speaker verification [13, 12], on the other hand, is an open set problem. The task is to verify whether a test utterance
claiming a particular speaker’s identity is actually spoken by that speaker (whose enrolment utterance is available
beforehand). The training data in the latter case, is generally utterances from a mutually exclusive set of speakers.
Although, speaker verification differs from speaker identification during the testing phase, most of the recent state-
of-the-art speaker verification systems [13, 22, 12, 23] are trained with the objective of learning to classify the set of
2Source codes are available at https://github.com/usc-sail/gard-adversarial-speaker-id
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training speakers. In other words, these models are trained with a cross-entropy objective over the unique set of training
speakers (i.e., similar to a speaker identification scenario).
Formally, if x ∈ RD denotes a time domain audio sample with speaker label y, then learning a speaker identifier model
is generally done through Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) [4]:
argmin
θ
E(x,y)∼D [L (x, y,θ)] (1)
where, L(·) is the cross-entropy objective, and θ denotes the set of trainable parameters of the DNN.
An intermediate representation of the trained DNN model might be subsequently extracted as a speaker embedding [13]
which is expected to carry speaker-specific information. The speaker embeddings are then utilized for verification
purposes. Because of this widespread use, in this study, we work with a closed set speaker identification (or classification)
model. The findings of this study can motivate future research on open set speaker verification task (see Section 7 for
future directions).
2.2 Adversarial attack
Given an audio sample x, an adversarial attack generates a perturbed signal given by
x˜ = x+ η such that ‖η‖p <  (2)
with the goal of forcing the classifier to produce erroneous output for x˜. In other words, if x has a true label y, then the
attacker forces the classifier to produce y˜ 6= y for the perturbed sample x˜. In this paper, we will focus on l∞ and l2
norms which are most widely employed in the literature.
2.2.1 Threat model
We explore white-box [8] attack in this study. This assumes that the attacker has complete knowledge of the model
architecture, parameters, loss functions, and gradients. We adopt this stronger form of attack (compared to black-box
attack [8]) because it does not assume that any part of the model can be kept hidden from the attacker, and it is the most
frequently employed threat model in the adversarial attack literature [3, 4, 5, 6].
Adversarial attack can be targeted or untargeted [8]. An untargeted attack only forces the model to generate erroneous
outputs, whereas, a targeted attack forces the model to predict a target class which is different from the true class. We
perform untargeted attacks in this study, and leave the targeted attack for future study (see Section 7).
2.2.2 Transferability
Although most of the experiments in this paper are with white box attacks, we study the transferability of adversarial
samples in Section 6.6, which gives us a notion of performance during a black box attack as well. The transferability
test [8, 24] evaluates the vulnerability of a target model against the adversarial samples generated with a source model.
The attacker has full knowledge about the source model, but no or limited knowledge about the target model (for
example, knowledge about the fact that both source and target have convolutional layers). The goal of the attacker is to
generate adversarial samples (with the source model) in such a way that they “transfer well” to the target model, i.e.,
those samples also make the target model vulnerable.
3 Related Work
This section describes key previous work on adversarial attack and defense methods proposed for speaker recognition
systems.
• Li et al. [25] showed that an i-vector [26] based speaker verification system is susceptible to adversarial
attacks, and the adversarial samples generated with the i-vector system also transfer well to a DNN-based
x-vector [13] system3. The attack was performed on the feature space (and not directly on the time domain
speech signal), and with only the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [3] (will be further discussed in Section 4)
was investigated for that purpose. Moreover, no defense method was proposed.
• Kreuk et al. [27] demonstrated the vulnerability of an end-to-end DNN-based speaker verification system to
FGSM attack. The attack was done on the feature space, and the authors discovered cross-feature transferability
of the adversarial samples. No defense method was proposed in the paper.
3i-vectors have been the state-of-the-art in speaker verification for a decade until DNN-based x-vectors were shown to outperform
them [23, 13].
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• Chen et al. [28] proposed the Natural Evolution Strategy (NES) based adversarial sample generation procedure,
and successfully attacked a GMM-UBM system4 and i-vector based speaker recognition systems. They found
impressive attack success rate with their proposed method. However, the authors did not attack more recent
DNN-based speaker recognition frameworks which are shown to have state-of-the-art performances. Moreover,
the test set involved in their experiments only included 5 speakers (TABLE I of [28]), and thus, an extensive
study with a much higher number of test speakers is still needed.
• Wang et al. [30] proposed adversarial regularization based defense methods using FGSM and Local Distribu-
tional Smoothness (LDS) [31] techniques. The proposed method was shown to improve the performance of a
speaker verification system, but only FGSM was employed as the attack algorithm, and similar to most of the
above methods, the attack was performed on the feature space and not on the time domain audio.
In summary, although these studies represent important initial efforts on adversarial attacks on speaker recognition
system, many technical questions still remain to be addressed. Limitations include consideration of primarily feature
space attacks [25, 27, 30] (and not time domain), limited number of attack algorithms [25, 27, 28, 30], limited number
of speakers in the test set [28], and no or limited number of defense methods [25, 27, 28]. The present exposition
study aims to address some of these limitations by reporting extensive experimental analysis, ablation studies, and by
proposing and evaluating various defense methods.
4 Attack and Defense Algorithms
4.1 Attack algorithms
A group of gradient-based attack algorithms tries to maximize the loss function by finding a suitable perturbation which
lies inside the lp-ball around x. Formally,
max
η:‖η‖p<
L (x+ η, y,θ) . (3)
A different group of algorithms aims at decreasing the posterior of the true output class, and increasing the posterior of
the most confusing wrong class. Here we present the attack algorithms we employ in our study.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). Goodfellow et al. [3] proposed this computationally efficient one-step l∞
attack to generate adversarial samples by only using the sign of the gradient function, and moving in the direction of
gradient to increase the loss:
x˜ = x+  sign (∇xL (x, y,θ)) . (4)
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). Madry et al. [4] proposed a more generalized version with iterative gradient
based l∞ attack:
x˜i+1 = Πx+S [x˜i + α sign (∇xL (x, y,θ))] , (5)
where, α is the step size of the gradient descent update, x+S is the set of allowed perturbations i.e., the l∞-ball around
x, and Πx+S denotes the constrained projection operation in a standard PGD optimization algorithm. PGD is run for a
fixed number of maximum iterations, T . Throughout the text, we will denote PGD run for T iterations by “PGD-T ”.
Carlini and Wagner attack (Carlini l2 and Carlini l∞). Carlini and Wagner [6] defined the general methodology
of their attack by
minimize ‖η‖p + c · g(x˜)
such that x˜ ∈ [0, 1]. (6)
Here, g(·) defines the objective function given by
g(x˜) =
[
Z(x˜)t −max
j 6=t
(Z(x˜)j) + δ
]
+
(7)
where, Z(·) is the output vector containing posterior probabilities for all the classes, t denotes the output node
corresponding to the true class y, δ is the confidence margin parameter, and [·]+ denotes the max(·, 0) function.
Intuitively, the attack tries to maximize the posterior probability of a class that is not the true class of x, but has the
highest posterior among all the wrong classes. The norm can be either l2 or l∞. For Carlini l∞ attack, the minimization
of ‖η‖∞ is not straightforward due to non-differentiability, and an iterative procedure is employed in [6]5.
4GMM-UBM stands for Gaussian Mixture Model-Universal Background Model, a classical model in speaker recognition [29].
5We suggest the readers to refer to [6] for detailed information about the iterative workaround for l∞ attack, and also for choosing
the values for the weight parameter, c.
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4.2 Defense algorithms
Adversarial training. The intuition here is to train the model on adversarial samples generated by a certain adversarial
attack. The adversarial samples are generated online using the training data and the current model parameters. Madry et
al. [4] introduced the generalized notion of adversarial training by a mini-max optimization given by:
argmin
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
η:‖η‖p<
L (x+ η, y,θ)
]
(8)
The inner maximization task is addressed by the attack algorithm utilized during adversarial training, and the outer
minimization is the standard ERM (Equation (1)) employed to train the model parameterized with θ. We separately
apply both one-step FGSM (Equation (4)), and T -step PGD (Equation (5)) algorithms to solve the inner maximization
problem. Throughout the remaining text, we refer to these as “FGSM adversarial training” and “PGD-T adversarial
training” respectively.
Notably, the overall training is done on clean as well as adversarial samples. The overall loss function is given by:
LAT(x, x˜, y,θ) = (1− wAT) · L(x, y,θ) + wAT · L(x˜, y,θ), (9)
where wAT is the weight of the adversarial training.
Adversarial Lipschitz Regularization (ALR). This approach of gaining robustness is based on learning a function
that is not much sensitive to a small change in the input. In other words, if we can learn a relatively smooth function,
then the posterior distribution should not vary abruptly if the input perturbation is within the maximum allowed limit.
We propose a training strategy equipped with the recently invented adversarial Lipschitz regularization technique [32].
Similar to the regularization based on local distribution smoothness in Virtual Adversarial Training (VAT) [31], ALR
imposes a regularization term defined using Lipschitz smoothness:
‖f‖L = sup
x,x˜ ∈X,dX(x,x˜)>0
dY (f(x), f(x˜))
dX(x, x˜)
, (10)
where f(·) the function of interest (implemented by the neural network) that maps the input metric space (X, dX) to
output metric space (Y, dY ). In our case of speaker classification, we chose f(·) as the final log-posterior output of
the network, i.e., f(x) = log p(y|x,θ), l1 norm as dY , and l2 norm as dX . The adversarial perturbation η =  ηk in
x˜ = x+ η is approximated by the power iterations:
ηi+1 =
∇ηidY
(
f(x), f(x+ ξηi)
)∥∥∇ηidY (f(x), f(x+ ξηi))∥∥2 , (11)
where, η0 is randomly initialized, and ξ is another hyperparameter (see Section 5.5). The regularization term added to
training is
LALR =
[
dY (f(x), f(x˜))
dX(x, x˜)
−K
]
+
, (12)
where K is the desired Lipschitz constant we wish to impose.
5 Experimental Setting
We implement the core of most of our attack and defense algorithms (except ALR) through the Adversarial Robustness
Toolbox [33]. For ALR, we follow the original implementation of [32]. The rest of the experimental details are
described below.
5.1 Dataset
We employ Librispeech [34] (the “train-clean-100” subset) dataset for all the experiments. It contains 100 hours of
clean speech from 251 unique speakers (125 females). We utilize all the speakers for our experiment. For every speaker,
we employ 90% of the utterances for training the classifier, and the remaining 10% utterances for testing. The train-test
split is deterministic, and it is kept fixed throughout all the experiments.
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5.2 Model architectures
We implemented our classifier, f : X → Y , by combining a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) with a digital signal
processing (DSP) front-end which is differentiable. The non-trainable DSP front-end extracts log Mel-spectrogram
which is viewed as a temporal signal of F channels, where F is the number of Mel frequency bins. The back-end is
either of the two DNN models described below. As both modules are differentiable, the adversarial attack schemes
introduced in Section 4 can be applied to create time-domain perturbation directly.
5.2.1 1D CNN
The model consists of 8 stacks of convolutional layers that transforms the Mel-spectrogram into the label space Y .
ReLU nonlinearity and batch normalization are used after every convolutional layer. Maxpool is employed after every
alternate layer. The penultimate layer has a dimension of 32. The model has total of 219k trainable parameters. We
perform most of our analysis with this model, and utilize the following TDNN model for transferability experiments.
5.2.2 TDNN
The Time Delay Neural Network (TDNN) [23, 13] is one of the current state-of-the-art models for speaker recognition.
We adopt the model architecture proposed in [13] for the experiments related to transferability analysis (Section 6.6).
The model consists of time-dilated convolutional layers along with a statistics pooling module, and it has ∼ 4.4 million
trainable parameters, and hence, is much larger than the 1D CNN model.
5.3 Training parameters
We employ the Adam optimizer [35] with a learning rate of 0.001, β1 = 0.5, and β2 = 0.999. We train with a minibatch
size of 128, and train all models (except ALR) for 30 epochs, since the training accuracy reaches almost 100% and
saturates within that. The ALR training converges much slowly, and thus, all ALR-based experiments are run for 2500
epochs. The training accuracy tends to saturate after that.
5.4 Attack parameters
Our main results (Section 6.3) are obtained from the experiment with attack strength  = 0.002 for l∞ attacks, and
confidence margin δ = 0 for Carlini l2 attack. The choice of  = 0.002 is due a reasonably strong SNR (∼ 30dB for
FGSM/PGD) of the adversarial samples (see Section 6.1). Furthermore, we vary the strength of different attacks, and
the results are shown in Section 6.4. The PGD attack is for 100 iterations with a step size α = /5.
5.5 Defense parameters
In ALR method, we set the number of power iterations K = 1, and the hyperparameter ξ = 10, as recommended
in [32]. The FGSM- and PGD-based adversarial training algorithms are run with  = 0.002. Hence, the main results
(Section 6.3) employ the same  value in both the attack and the adversarial training based defense. The ablation
study in Section 6.4 is particularly designed to investigate the effect of using different values of  during the attack.
Specifically, the study varies  above and below the vicinity of  = 0.002 (set during defense training), and analyzes
the effectiveness of the defense method. The PGD adversarial training uses 10 iterations (i.e., PGD-10 as introduced
in Section 4.2)6, although we evaluated it against PGD attack with higher number of iterations (Section 6.3 and 6.5).
During adversarial training, we create minibatches containing equal number of clean and adversarial samples, i.e., in
Equation (9), we set wAT = 0.5.
6 Results and Discussion
6.1 Attack strength vs. SNR
To have a substantial understanding about the strength of different attack algorithms, we computed the mean Signal-to-
Noise Ratio (SNR) of all the test adversarial samples for every level of attack strength. For l∞ attacks,  varies between
{0.0005, 0.002, 0.0035, 0.005}, and for Carlini l2 attack the confidence margin δ varies between {0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1}.
The curves for l∞ attacks are shown in Figure 1a. There are two important observations. First, the average level of SNR
is ∼ 30 dB higher for Carlini l∞ than FGSM and PGD. Second, the SNR level tends to decrease faster with increase in
6PGD adversarial training is slow, and we could not afford to run it for more than 10 iterations.
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(b) Attack strength vs. perceptibility
Figure 1: Mean SNR and PESQ score of the test adversarial samples generated by different l∞ attack algorithms at
different strengths.
 for PGD and FGSM as compared to Carlini l∞. The reason might be attributed to the optimization algorithms that
various attack methods use for generating the adversarial samples. For example, the Carlini method enforces minimum
perturbation required to change the output prediction, while PGD enforces perturbation projected inside the l∞-ball of
size  around x. We have also computed mean SNR for Carlini l2 attack for different values of the confidence margin δ.
The SNR level tends to stay around 75 dB, and does not vary much with increasing δ. A visualization of the adversarial
spectrograms is shown in Appendix A for a more detailed analysis of the attack algorithms.
6.2 Attack strength vs. perceptibility
We measure the perceptibility of the generated adversarial samples by employing Perceptual Evaluation of Speech
Quality (PESQ) [36, 37]. While subjective measure with multiple human annotators can be more accurate, it is
time-consuming and costly. The objective PESQ measure has been the ITU-T standard for measuring telephonic
transmission quality. It gives a mean opinion score by comparing the degraded speech signal with the original speech
recording. The PESQ score is between −0.5 to 4.5, and a higher value indicates better quality. Figure 1b depicts the
average PESQ scores of all the test adversarial samples generated via different attack methods at various strengths. We
can see the gradual degradation of audio quality with the increase of attack strength. Similar to the findings in the SNR
analysis (Section 6.1), Carlini l∞ attack produces more perceptible adversarial audio samples than PGD-100 and FGSM.
The degradation is also slower for Carlini attack. It is noteworthy that at  = 0.0005 the attack algorithms are able to
achieve high audio quality (PESQ score > 4.0), but force the classifier to produce erroneous outputs (Section 6.4). We
have also computed the average PESQ score for Carlini l2 attack. The PESQ score is ∼ 4.4, and does not vary much
with change in the confidence margin δ.
6.3 Main results
Table 1 presents the test performance of standard training (without any defense) and all the employed defense methods
for three l∞ attacks, and one l2 attack. All the performances are averaged over 10 random runs. The l∞ attacks are
with  = 0.002, and all the adversarial training methods are run with the same  value. As we can see, the accuracy of
the standard training method drops from 94% by a significant margin for all the attacks. This shows the vulnerability of
the model, and further underscores the need for strong countermeasures. A comparison between the three l∞ attacks
shows the FGSM is the weakest one (25% adversarial accuracy for standard training), and PGD-100 (PGD with 100
iterations) is the strongest one (0% adversarial accuracy for standard training).
Comparing different defense methods, we can see that FGSM-based adversarial training is the weakest defense strategy.
The ALR method is better than FGSM adversarial training, although it fails to defend against a PGD-100 attack. The
PGD-10 adversarial training is found to perform the best in our experiments. It is interesting to see that PGD adversarial
training with 10 iterations is able to defend against a PGD attack with 100 iterations. The proposed PGD-10 adversarial
training gives absolute improvements of 48%, 56% and 43% over the undefended performance against FGSM, Carlini
l∞ and PGD-100 attacks, respectively.
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Table 1: Different attacks on a speaker recognition system, and performance of different defense methods. “Benign”
denotes accuracy on clean samples, and “Adv.” denotes accuracy on adversarial samples. Accuracy is on a scale of
[0, 1].
Standard
training
FGSM
adv. training ALR
PGD-10
adv. training
Norm Attack Benign Adv. Benign Adv. Benign Adv. Benign Adv.
l∞
FGSM
0.94
0.25
0.82
0.20
0.96
0.44
0.92
0.73
Carlini l∞ 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.58
PGD-100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43
l2 Carlini l2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
As observed in the previous literature, the performance gain achieved by PGD-10 adversarial training against different
adversarial attacks generally results in a drop in benign accuracy. Similarly, in our experiment, the accuracy on the
clean test samples drops for both FGSM- and PGD-based adversarial training methods, with the FGSM variant getting
higher drop in performance. The ALR method, on the other hand, achieves a 2% absolute improvement in benign
accuracy compared to the model with standard training, possibly because of lesser overfitting due to the presence of the
penalty term shown in Equation (12).
The last row of Table 1 shows the performance of different defense methods against Carlini l2 attack. Standard training,
FGSM adversarial training, and ALR algorithms are unable to defend against this attack. Defense with PGD-10
adversarial training also performs poorly for this l2 attack. The reason might be attributed to the adversarial training
methodology which is based on l∞ perturbation, and thus, probably fails to defend against a strong l2 attack.
A related ablation study is provided in Appendix B which shows the similarity between the misclassified predictions
made by the model under different attacks. This could possibly reveal some inherent similarities between different
attacks.
6.4 Ablation study 1: Varying attack strength
Figure 2 shows how the performances of different defense methods vary when we vary the strength of the adversarial
attacks. Note that the adversarial training-based defense methods still employ the same  = 0.002 during training, but 
of the attack algorithm varies.
We can observe that the general trend of the curves is downward with the increase of the strength of any attack. The only
exception is the standard training scenario for FGSM attack. The performance surprisingly increases in the beginning
and then saturates.
Comparing different defense methods, we can see the PGD-10 adversarial training continues to outperform all the other
defense methods for all attack types, and for all strength levels. The proposed ALR training is found to be the next best
defense technique.
Another interesting observation is that the accuracy curves for both the Carlini methods are more flat in nature compared
to FGSM and PGD attacks. The reason might be attributed to the relatively less drop in SNR values of the test
adversarial samples generated by Carlni method as the attack strength increases, as explained in Section 6.1.
6.5 Ablation study 2: Analyzing the best defense method
Here we analyze the best defense method, i.e., PGD-10 adversarial training, in further detail. Specifically, we investigate
its behavior when we attack it with PGD attack with different number of iterations and at different strengths. Figure 3
shows the variation of the adversarial accuracy for PGD-10 defense. Each line denotes attack at a particular strength
i.e., a particular  value. The horizontal axis denotes the iteration number, varying in the range {10, 20, 30, 50, 100}.
A closer inspection reveals that after the first drop in performance for PGD-10 attack to PGD-20 attack, the accuracy
value tends to decrease very slowly. For example, at  = 0.002, adversarial accuracy against PGD-10 attack is ∼ 48%.
Then a 3% absolute drop is observed when we perform a PGD-20 attack, and the adversarial accuracy becomes ∼ 45%.
The accuracy tends to drop very slowly afterwards, and we see a ∼ 43% accuracy against a PGD-100 attack. We
hypothesize that this behavior happens because around 20 to 30 iterations might be enough to project the perturbed
adversarial samples to the edge of the l∞-ball, and thus much higher number of iterations do not necessarily produce a
stronger attack.
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                             
   
   
   
   
   
   
 $ G
 Y H
 U V
 D U
 L D
 O  D
 F F
 X U
 D F
 \
 ' H I H Q V H
 6 W D Q G D U G  W U D L Q L Q J
 ) * 6 0  D G Y   W U D L Q L Q J
 $ / 5
 3 * '     D G Y   W U D L Q L Q J
(c) PGD-100 attack
                             
   
   
   
   
   
   
 $ G
 Y H
 U V
 D U
 L D
 O  D
 F F
 X U
 D F
 \
 ' H I H Q V H
 6 W D Q G D U G  W U D L Q L Q J
 ) * 6 0  D G Y   W U D L Q L Q J
 $ / 5
 3 * '     D G Y   W U D L Q L Q J
(d) Carlini l2 attack
Figure 2: Ablation study 1: Varying the strength ( for three l∞ attacks, δ for the Carlini l2 attack) in different attack
algorithms, and performance of different defense methods.
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Figure 3: Performance of PGD-10 adversarial training against PGD attack at different strengths, and with different
number of iterations.
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Table 2: Transferability of adversarial samples between different models. The adversarial samples are generated with
the “source” model, but seem to be effective against the “target” model as well. Accuracy is on a scale of [0, 1].
Benign accuracy Adversarial accuracy Adversarial accuracy
Source attack  1D CNN TDNN Source1D CNN
Target
TDNN
Source
TDNN
Target
1D CNN
FGSM 0.002 0.98 0.87 0.19 0.40 0.03 0.16PGD-100 0 0.36 0 0.08
Table 3: Effect of training data augmentation with white Gaussian noise. Accuracy is on a scale of [0, 1].
Benign accuracy Adversarial accuracy
Attack  No augmentation Augmentation No augmentation Augmentation
FGSM 0.002 0.94 0.95 0.25 0.17PGD-100 0 0
6.6 Ablation study 3: Transferability analysis
We perform the transferability analysis between the smaller CNN model, and the larger TDNN model (please see
Section 5.2 for model architectures). Table 2 shows the benign accuracies for both the models7. We can see that
adversarial samples crafted from the “source” model tend to be harmful for the “target” model as well, as evident from
the significant drop in the performances. Adversarial samples generated with the larger model (TDNN) tend to be
more effective in attacking the smaller model. Further studies are needed to fully understand the observed pattern of
transferability.
6.7 Ablation study 4: Effect of noise augmentation
Noise augmentation is a standard technique employed during training a speaker recognition model [13, 38]. Here, we
experiment with augmenting the dataset with white Gaussian noise (scaled with a factor equal to the  used in the attack)
during training the undefended model. The model is trained with both clean and noisy samples. The experimental
observations are tabulated in Table 3. As expected, the benign accuracy improves. However, we could not find any
improvement in the performance of the model for defending against FGSM and PGD-100 adversarial attacks. The
reason might be attributed to the ability of attack algorithms to generate more novel noise samples (compared to simple
white Gaussian noise) that force the model posteriors to change.
7 Conclusion and Future Directions
The paper presented an extensive exploratory analysis of adversarial attacks on a closed set speaker recognition system.
We reported results obtained from experiments with multiple state-of-the-art attack algorithms with varying attack
strengths. We also investigated state-of-the-art defense methods, and adopted them for employing as countermeasures
for the speaker recognition model. We performed several ablation studies to understand the SNR characteristics and
perceptibility of the adversarial speech, analyze the transferability of the adversarial attacks, and the effectiveness of
white noise augmentation during training. The main observations are the following:
• Speaker recognition system such as the one employed in the current study is vulnerable to white box adversarial
attacks. The performance of the undefended model dropped from 94% to 0% with the strongest attack (PGD-
100) in our experiment even at 40 dB SNR and PESQ score > 4.
• Adversarial samples crafted with the Carlini and Wagner method are found to have the best perceptual quality
in terms of the PESQ score.
• The adversarial samples generated with a particular source model are found to transfer well to a different target
model, and hence, are also harmful for the target model. This is particularly alarming because it can open up
chances for black box attacks.
7The TDNN model has lower benign accuracy possibly because of overfitting, but we do not spend time to fine-tune the TDNN
model. Transferability of the adversarial samples is still clear from the table.
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• Augmenting training data with white Gaussian noise is not found to be effective.
• Experimenting with several defense methods showed that PGD-based adversarial training is the best defense
strategy in out setting.
• Although, PGD adversarial training is the best defense method, it is not found to be effective against l2 attack
in our experiments, probably because of employing l∞ norm during training.
We hope the source codes published along with this paper can be helpful to the research community interested in
pursuing further work in this domain. Several important future directions can be taken from here.
• Extending the work for a speaker verification setting would a good exploratory direction. Specifically, an
end-to-end system like [30] can be investigated with the state-of-the-art attacks introduced in this paper, and
performances of different defense algorithms can be established.
• Metric learning such as triplet training [39] are shown to learn compact and robust embeddings against
adversarial attacks for images [40, 41]. Metric learning is also found to be useful for learning robust speaker
embeddings in [38]. A natural extension can be to verify the adversarial robustness of speaker embeddings
learning via metric learning.
• Adaptive attacks [42] are particularly designed to break any specific defense algorithm. The strategies
introduced in [42] can be a starting point to perform model-specific adversarial attacks on existing defense
methods proposed for speaker recognition systems.
• Studying targeted attacks might be another good direction from here, especially, since this could be a potential
threat for biometric systems that rely on speaker recognition modules.
• Finally, further research can be done on crafting imperceptible (to human judgement or by retaining high
PESQ score) adversarial audio samples with high attack success rate such as in [18], and also formulating
effective detection [43] and defense algorithms as countermeasures.
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Appendices
A Visualizing spectrograms
Figure 4 shows the mel-spectrograms of a randomly chosen utterance for different attacks at varying  values. Here, for
exploratory analysis, we increase  beyond the range specified in our experiments described in the main text. We can see
that for both FGSM and PGD, the noise is visible in the mel-spectrogram for  = 0.002. The signal becomes extremely
noisy for  = 0.2 (SNR drops below −10 dB, and PESQ score < 1.5). On the other hand, for Carlini l∞ attack, the
noise is almost invisible at  = 0.002 and  = 0.02, as also evident from the high SNR values and PESQ scores. The
noise becomes somewhat visible at  = 0.2 where the SNR drops to 10 dB, and the PESQ score becomes ∼ 3.4.
B Similarity in misclassification for different attacks
We investigate whether different attack algorithms force the model to misclassify a particular input utterance as the same
(wrong) speaker. This could possibly reveal similarity between different attack algorithms. Figure 5 shows the fraction
of similarity (i.e., average number of matches) between the wrong predictions made by the model for different attacks.
As evident, wrong predictions for Carlini l∞ and Carlini l2 attacks are very similar (> 90% similarity for all the 
values), possibly because the inherent strategy of the Carlini attack remains the same in the two variants. The similarity
between FGSM and the two Carlini attacks is also noticeable. More interestingly, the similarity scores tend to decrease
when  increases. We hypothesize that a low  constrains the attack algorithm with a smaller space for perturbation, and
hence, the model generally tends to wrongly predict the closest class (one that causes the most confusion). On the other
hand, a high  opens up a lot more allowed space for the perturbation, and hence, the similarity between the wrong
predictions tends to decrease.
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Figure 4: Spectrograms of an original utterance and its perturbed versions under different l∞ attacks at varying strengths.
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Figure 5: Similarity (on a scale of [0,1]) between wrong predictions made by the model for different attacks.
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